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Abstract 
Satellites typically operate in isolation from their orbiting neighbours, leaving them susceptible to 
even the most minor of failures. Loss of a payload, radio or critical supporting sub-system could 
render the platform useless, an unfavourable situation for mission stakeholders. There is however a 
partial solution through the addition of inter-satellite networking, which offers not only value in 
terms of general performance, but added resilience to failure in the form of degraded operations. 
While a traditional platform exhibits two fundamental states: operational (which includes the 
collection and dissemination of data) and failed, a network-capable platform (i.e. one with an inter-
satellite communication capability) exhibits six states, each reached through a unique combination 
of sub-system failures. The result of this added resilience is a reduction in the likelihood of the 
satellite reaching a fully-failed state, at the burden of higher financial cost and complexity. 
  
                                                             
* Research Fellow, christopher.lowe@strath.ac.uk Ș Director, malcolm.macdonald.102@strath.ac.uk 
 15th Reinventing Space Conference, 2017  2 
 
1. Introduction 
Failures can, and do, occur on space systems, sometimes with serious consequences. Be it at a 
component, sub-system or platform-level, anomalies in space are often difficult to resolve, 
especially if they occur on hardware. Here, the impact of including an inter-satellite networking 
(ISN) capability, and how it can aǯs, is investigated. 
ISN can be defined as the ability to communicate with orbital neighbours, such that data can be 
transferred via inter-satellite communication links [1]. While the concept of ISN is not new, the       ǯ  ሺǤǤ     
degradation as a result of failure) has not received much attention. In what follows, methods for the 
assessment of failure effects are introduced and a model that captures the addition of ISN, and its 
impact on system resilience, is presented. Discrete-time Markov chains (Section 2) are used to 
describe the transition between states, where a platform containing ISN features additional 
degraded states not present on non-ISL capable platforms. These additional states enable the 
platform to reside in a functional state for longer, thus adding value to a mission despite partial on-
board failures (Section 3). 
2. Background 
A point design, i.e. one that is rigid in its characteristics and operation, may be optimal in the 
nominal environment for which it was developed, but may be left exposed in the real world in 
which uncertainties exist. Consideration of uncertainties as part of the design process, in particular 
from the point of view of failure (reliability engineering), has been practiced since the early 1900s 
[2]. However, studies into the effects resulting from arbitrary uncertain events taking place has only 
recently come to the fore [3]Ȃ[5]. For clarity, uncertainty can be separated into two forms; i) 
aleatoric Ȃ that which cannot be known a priori, such as minor fluctuations in atmospheric 
conditions or the time of future solar activity, and ii) epistemic Ȃ that which occurs due to lack of 
knowledge, such as the centre of mass of an instrument or the cost of a launch. Here, while both are 
acknowledged as important and valid, only the former (aleatoric) will be considered. Irrespective of 
the type of aleatoric uncertainty (e.g. failure, market change, environmental change, technology 
obsolescence), the over-arching effect is generally a drop in system utility (performance), which we 
hope to measure in order to better understand utility   ǯ e. The change 
considered here is failure of on board systems, resulting in full or partial platform degradation. 
Markov chains offer a convenient way of modelling the stochastic process of component/system 
failure and allow evaluation of expected state evolution over time. A Markov process is a stochastic 
process defined by a set of random variables ሼܺሺݐሻǡ ݐ א ܶሽ, where each ܺሺݐሻ is a random variable, or ǲǳǡǡ  ݐ. T is the time horizon and can be discrete in 
nature, where ܶ ൌ ሼ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ ǥ ሽ forms a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC), or continuous, where ܶ ൌ ሼݐǣ  ? ൑ ݐ ൏  ? ሽ forms a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). For the purposes of this work, 
the focus shall be on DTMCs due their applicability to systems for which the probability of 
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transitioning between states may be time-varying [6]. The Markov property is analogous to the 
memoryless property, such that transition from one state to another depends only on the current 
state, and not on states in which the system resided during some previous time. Formally, this is 
ሼܺ௡ାଵ ൌ ݔ௡ାଵȁܺ௡ ൌ ݔ௡ǡ ܺ௡ିଵ ൌ ݔ௡ିଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܺ଴ ൌ ݔ଴ሽ ൌ ሼܺ௡ାଵ ൌ ݔ௡ାଵȁܺ௡ ൌ ݔ௡ሽǡ 2.1 
where ݔ௜ is the state of the system at time ݅. The above can be simplified to ݌௜௝ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ሼܺ௡ାଵ ൌ ݆ȁܺ௡ ൌ ݅ሽǤ 2.2 
Given a discrete and finite set of states, the matrix ܲሺ݊ሻ, in which ݌௜௝ሺ݊ሻ is the entry in the ݅௧௛ row 
and ݆௧௛ column, is called the transition probability matrix, and contains the probability of 
transitioning between any two states at time ݊. ܲሺ݊ሻ is written as 
ܲሺ݊ሻ ൌ ൦݌ଵଵሺ݊ሻ ݌ଵଶሺ݊ሻ ڮ ݌ଵ௄ሺ݊ሻ݌ଶଵሺ݊ሻ ݌ଶଶሺ݊ሻ ڮ ݌ଶ௄ሺ݊ሻڭ݌௄ଵሺ݊ሻ ڭ݌௄ଶሺ݊ሻ ڰ ڭڮ ݌௄௄ሺ݊ሻ൪ǡ 2.3 
where ܭ is the number of discrete states and thus ܲሺ݊ሻ ൌ Թ௄ൈ௄. It follows that 
෍ ݌௜௝ሺ݊ሻ௔௟௟௝ ൌ  ?ǡ ׊݅ǡ 2.4 
where ݅ ൌ ݆ is a possible scenario and simply represents the absence of any transition from the 
current state. In a (time-) nonhomogeneous DTMC, ܲሺ݊ሻ may vary with ݊, which is an important 
characteristic to capture for systems that suffer from either reliability decay over time, or a higher 
failure probability at the beginning of life. Analysis into the robustness/survivability achieved from 
swarm size [7] and system fractionation [8] has been conducted using a homogeneous DTMC, 
which results in this time-varying phenomena being missed. In [9] and [10] it is shown that this 
time-varying property is real for space systems and should be incorporated. 
For systems that do not undergo servicing or repair, applicable to the majority of satellites, 
transition from a failed state back to an operational one is not possible, such that the 1st column 
inܲሺ݊ሻ is ሾ݌ଵଵሺ݊ሻ  ?  ?  ?ሿ் and the final row (fully failed) is ሾ ?  ?  ?  ?ሿ, which represents an 
absorbing state. 
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As an example, Figure 1 illustrates a typical Markov chain with four states, in which state 2 always 
transitions (no arc to itself) and state 4 is absorbing. It is recognised that satellite systems generally 
feature redundancy on most sub-systems, in particular on those that are mission critical. This is 
considered throughout this work such that the failure probabilities used are derived from actual 
flight data, where redundant systems, if present, would have failed. 
 
Figure 1 Ȃ Example of a DTMC with an absorbing state 
In order to identify the expected utility being offered by a system subject to stochastic failures over 
its lifetime, transient analysis should be conducted, which provides an answer to the question ǲݔ after ݉ time steps, given that it is in state ݕ ǳǫ. The Chapman Kolmogorov equations offer such functionality, derived from the fact that 
the probability for a two-step transition from state ݅ to ݇ is 
ሼܺ௡ାଶ ൌ ݇ȁܺ௡ାଵ ൌ ݆ǡ ܺ௡ ൌ ݅ሽ ൌ ݌௜௝݌௝௞ ǡ ׊݆ א ሼ ?ǡ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܭሽǡ ሼܺ௡ାଶ ൌ ݇ȁܺ௡ ൌ ݅ሽ ൌ ෍ ݌௜௝݌௝௞௔௟௟௝ ǡ 2.5 
which is the ݅݇௧௛ element in ܲଶ for a homogenous DTMC, or the ݅݇௧௛ element in ܲሺ௡ାଶሻሺ݊ǡ ݊ ൅  ?ǡ ݊ ൅ ?ሻ ൌ ܲሺ݊ ൅  ?ሻܲሺ݊ ൅  ?ሻܲሺ݊ሻ in a non-homogeneous DTMC. This can be generalised to obtain the 
Chapman Kolmogorov equation for non-homogeneous DTMCs, as 
ܲሺ௠ሻሺ݊ǡ ݊ ൅  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ ൅ ݉ െ  ?ሻ ൌ ܲሺ݊ሻܲሺ݊ ൅  ?ሻ ǥ ܲሺ݊ ൅ ݉ െ  ?ሻǤ 2.6 
Finally, given a row vector ߨሺ௡ሻ ൌ Թଵൈ௄ describing the probability of being in state ݅ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܭሽ at 
some time ݊, the probability of being in state ݅ at time ሺ݉ ൅ ݊ሻ is 
ߨሺ௠ା௡ሻ ൌ ߨሺ௡ሻܲሺ݊ሻܲሺ݊ ൅  ?ሻ ǥ ܲሺ݊ ൅ ݉ െ  ?ሻǤ 2.7 
1
3
2
4
݌ଵଷ ሺ݌ଶସሻ
ሺ݌ଷସሻ
ܲ ൌ ݌ଵଵ ? ݌ଵଶ ? ݌ଵଷ݌ଶଷ  ?݌ଶସ ? ? ݌ଷଶ ? ݌ଷଷ ? ݌ଷସ ?
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3. Failure on Space Systems 
As discussed, aleatoric uncertainty is considered in this analysis, in particular with respect to 
system failure. Complete failure affects over 6% of satellites within their first 7 years and almost 
9% of satellites within their first 12 years [9]. It is therefore not something that can be ignored, and 
both the likelihood of its arrival and its effects on the mission utility, should be understood. Exactly 
how a particular sub-system fails can be considered arbitrary for the purposes of this analysis, 
however it is important to understand the likelihood of failure occurring over a particular 
timeframe. It has been shown, in [9] and [11], that satellite sub-system failure can be approximated 
to a Weibull distribution, capturing the higher probability of failure at beginning of life that is 
neglected when using other functions, such as a linear regression. The reliability of a traditional 
space platform, or in other words its probability of residing in a non-failed state, is shown in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2 Ȃ Weibull distribution correlation to actual satellite reliability data [9] 
The operation of a traditional, monolithic satellite can typically be reduced to that of data collection 
via its payload/s, followed by data delivery to the end user via its communication sub-system/s. 
Failure of either of these sub-systems, or a critical supporting element (e.g. power system or on-
board computer), would result in this functionality not being possible and thus transition into a 
failed state.  In reality, there exist various intermediate, partially-failed states following failure of 
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some non-critical component*, but for the purposes of this work, and to effectively illustrate the 
effect of a networking capability, these are omitted. For a satellite with an inter-satellite networking 
capability, there exists another function in addition to the nominal collect and deliver capabilities. 
This is its ability to relay information, which not only provides a higher nominal utility via 
increased functionality, but introduces four degraded operational states that are not available to a 
non-networked system. This is described in Figure 3, where the assumption is made that additional 
hardware is required for ISN, thus offering additional resilienceȘ. 
 
Figure 3 Ȃ State transition Markov chain diagram for a networked and non-networked system 
Figure 3 shows the state possibilities being considered here, including the partially failed states and 
the potential transitions to and from each state. 
  
                                                             
* Consider, for example, failure of a string of solar cells or degraded reaction wheel mobility. The result would 
likely be a reduction in payload duty-cycle, such that some utility can still be maintained, but at a lower level 
than if fully operational Ș While it is technically feasible that an ISN capability is implemented using the same hardware as used 
between the satellite and ground station, for the purposes of this work an ISL is assumed to require 
additional hardware. This is considered a reasonable assumption given the likelihood of differences in link 
frequency and potential pointing demands. 
Payload 
fail
Full ops
Collect 
& Relay
Collect 
& 
Deliver
Relay & 
Deliver
Failed
Relay
Payload/comms/
support fail
Payload 
fail
Comms
fail
ISL/
ISL+comms/
Support fail
ISL/support
fail
Payload+
comms fail
All/
support 
fail
ISL fail
Comms fail
ISL/
ISL+payload/
support fail
 15th Reinventing Space Conference, 2017  7 
 
The information in Figure 3 is summarised in Table 1. 
# State 
Transition 
Comment 
from to 
1 Full Ops None All All systems operational 
2 Collect & Deliver 1 6 ISL fail (full ops for traditional system)  
3 Collect & Relay 1 5, 6 Communications fail 
4 Relay & Deliver 1 5, 6 Payload fail 
5 Relay 1, 3, 4 6 Payload & communications fail 
6 Failed All None 
1. Critical support system failure, or 
2. Combined failure of ISL and either 
payload or comunications systems 
Table 1 Ȃ State definition and transition (transitions from/to self not included) 
Indeed, all partially- or fully-failed states could transition to a more operational state if a 
repair/replace service was available. This concern is not addressed in this work. The Markov chain 
in Figure 3 can also be represented as a probability state-transition matrix of the form 
ܲሺݐ௞ሻ ൌ ۏێێێ
ێۍ݌ଵଵ ݌ଵଶ ݌ଵଷ ? ݌ଶଶ  ? ?  ? ݌ଷଷ ݌ଵସ ݌ଵହ ݌ଵ଺ ?  ? ݌ଶ଺ ? ଷܲହ ݌ଷ଺ ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ? ݌ସସ ݌ସହ ݌ସ଺ ? ݌ହହ ݌ହ଺ ?  ?  ? ےۑۑۑ
ۑېǡ 3.1 
where ܲሺݐ௞ሻ is the transition matrix at time ݐ௞, and ݌௜௝  is the probability that the system will 
transition from state ݅ to state ݆ during time period ݐ௞ାଵ െ ݐ௞. Note that the number of non-zero 
entries along the row direction indicates the number of states to which a state (defined by row 
number) can transition, and along the column direction the number of states from which a state 
(defined by column number) can be transitioned. Owing to the fact that the probability of 
transitioning between states, in the case of space platforms, is variable with time (time-
nonhomogeneous), the discrete-time form of Markov chains is employed, whereby the matrix ܲ 
may differ over the lifetime. Recall from Section 3, that the probability of being in each state at time ݐ௞, given the likelihood of being in each initial state as defined by the vector ߨሺ଴ሻ, is ߨሺ௧ೖሻ ൌ ߨሺ଴ሻܲሺ ?ሻܲሺ ?ሻ ǥ ܲሺݐ௞ െ  ?ሻǤ 3.2 
For illustrative purposes, consider a satellite with failure probabilities for the payload, ISN system, 
communication system and critical support systems, of 5%, 4%, 3% and 5% respectively, in any 
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given year. The state probability plot is shown for both a non-networked system (Figure 4) and a 
networked system (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4 Ȃ State probability of a system without networking capability 
 
Figure 5 Ȃ State probability of a system with a networking capability 
What Figure 4 and Figure 5 tell us is that, for this specific set of transition probabilities; 
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i. A network-capable system is equally likely to remain in either a fully operational state or a 
collect & deliver state, as a non-networked system is to remain in its fully operational state 
(which is, by definition, a collect & deliver state). 
ii. A network-capable system is less likely to enter into a fully failed state, since there are 
intermediate, degraded states that are reachable. In this example, after 7 years, the 
networked system is ~23% less likely to be in a fully failed state, than a non-networked 
system. 
While the failure likelihood of the above figures is perhaps exaggerated for illustrative effect, it is 
clear that there may be value in incorporating inter-satellite networking, with regards to lifetime 
utility, but it will come at a cost. Whether this additional financial and complexity burden is worth 
taking must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
4. Conclusions 
The presence of an inter-satellite networking (ISN) capability on a space platform enables on-board 
functionality to be maintained following failures that would otherwise render a non-ISN capable 
platform unserviceable. These additional, partially-failed, states are enabled through the ǲǳǡǤǤransfer data to/from other satellites. While 
for a traditional, monolithic satellite, failure of the payload or downlink communication system 
would prevent useful operations taking place, an ISN-ǲƬǳǲcollect & ǳǡǤ	ǡboth the payload 
and communication system, the ISN-capable satellite could still offer a relay-service for other 
satellites with ISN capabilities. 
It is clear that ISN not only offers additional capability, which could add value to a mission during 
nominal (fully-functional) operations, but it brings a higher likelihood that a platform would 
remain in a non-failed state during its lifetime. 
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